“Population Invasion” versus Urban Exclusion in the Tibetan Areas of Western China by Fischer, A.M. (Andrew Martín)
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 34(4 ) :  631–662  (DECEMBER 2008)  631
“Population Invasion” 
versus Urban Exclusion 
in the Tibetan Areas of 
Western China
ANDREW MARTIN FISCHER
AS ELSEWHERE IN the world, demographic changes have been fundamental 
to the emergence of modernity in the Tibetan areas of western China. These 
areas hereafter are referred to as Tibet, which includes the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous areas absorbed into Qinghai, 
Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan Provinces (see Figure 1).1 The demographic 
changes include the onset of the demographic transition, urbanization, and 
increased in-migration of non-Tibetans from other parts of China (largely Han 
Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Chinese Muslims).2 However, the fact that 
these changes started around the same time as Communist rule in 1950 has 
led to their conflation with the related but distinct issue of the subjugation 
of Tibet into the modern Chinese nation state. As a result, some of the most 
vigorous condemnations as well as defenses of rule by the People’s Republic 
of China in Tibet have been framed in terms of population.
The reigning view in the Tibetan exile community—as well as among 
most Western observers and “Tibet Support Groups,” and most Tibetans 
and even some Chinese whom I interviewed in Tibet—alleges that Han 
Chinese and Chinese Muslim migrants are quite simply overrunning the 
existing Tibetan population in Tibet. This phenomenon is typically referred 
to as “population invasion,” “population swamping,” “population transfer,” 
“demographic invasion,” or “demographic aggression.”3 Indeed, in 2007 
for the first time tourists (mostly domestic Han Chinese) outnumbered the 
local population in the Tibet Autonomous Region. This is indicative of the 
sheer volume of Han Chinese movement in and out of this region, includ-
ing Han migrants to service the tourist traffic and the more general govern-
ment-subsidized economic boom. Parallel to this, many Tibetans fear that 
Beijing has been attempting to limit the growth of the Tibetan population 
through stringent family planning measures, including forced abortions and 
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sterilization programs. The concern is that Tibet will soon come to resemble 
Inner Mongolia, where ethnic Mongolians accounted for only 17 percent of 
the population in the 2000 census, or Xinjiang, where Han accounted for 
40 percent of the population, up from around 6 percent in the early 1950s. 
Many exiled Tibetan leaders claim that Tibetans may already be a minority 
in several Tibetan areas.4 At the extreme, these concerns led in the past to 
accusations of genocide, which have since been tempered to accusations of 
cultural genocide, referring to the disappearance of Tibetans as an identifiable 
cultural group as the result of Sinicization.5
Conversely, Beijing denies that non-Tibetan migrants have been over-
running the local population. The government regularly points out that 
ethnic Tibetans accounted for about 93 percent of the resident population 
of the TAR in the 2000 census.6 Instead, it argues that migration to Tibet has 
mostly benefited Tibetans. Migrants have been the ushers of government 
policies that have improved the quality of life of Tibetans since the 1950s, as 
demonstrated by rapid population growth (versus stagnation for centuries 
prior to 1950), a doubling of life expectancy, and impressive improvements in 
a variety of other human development indicators.7 From this perspective, the 
PRC government argues that the disparities of regional development between 
Tibet and other regions of China are due to the developmental backwardness 
and remoteness of Tibet, which Beijing, with the help of migrants and some 
rich coastal provinces, has sought to overcome by large-scale material and 
human investment.8 The government thus credits itself with benevolently 
FIGURE 1   Tibetan cultural areas and western provinces of China
NOTE: The five shades of gray distinguish the indigenously designated Tibetan regions of Amdo, Kham, Utsang, 
Jangtang, and Ngari.  
SOURCE: The Tibetan and Himalayan Digital Library, «www.thdl.org» (University of Virginia Library).
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uplifting the backward and “feudal” social conditions of Tibet.9 While the 
emphasis on population growth within this discourse is ironic in light of gov-
ernment objectives to limit population growth elsewhere in China, it must 
be understood in the context of accusations by Tibetan exiles of genocide or 
population control.10 
Both views are partially valid. In the case of population invasion, only 
in the major cities and towns of Tibet can one plausibly argue that Han are 
outnumbering Tibetans. Ironically, the perception of population swamping is 
essentially an urban-centric assessment of the changing ethnic composition of 
Tibet, even while the Tibetan areas remain some of the most rural in China. 
In terms of disparities, it is also true that urban–rural inequality is strongly 
associated with ethnic inequality in Tibet, given that most Tibetans are rural 
while most Han living in Tibet are urban. This observation leads some schol-
ars, such as Sautman and Eng (2001), to claim that the apparent ethnic bias 
of development in Tibet is mostly a reflection of an urban bias and, as such, 
is no different from similar developmental dilemmas elsewhere in China, 
except that rural Tibet happens to be populated mostly by Tibetans. There are 
various problems with this argument; most importantly, it distracts attention 
from ethnic exclusions occurring within the urban areas themselves and from 
intra-urban inequalities that are among the highest in China. 
This article seeks to clarify the politicized debate on population and 
development in Tibet as a means to refocus attention on the dynamics of 
urban exclusion as they affect Tibetans. It does not offer a comprehensive 
demographic and population survey of Tibet, which already exists in the 
literature from both sides of the debate.11 Rather, it analyzes macro-level de-
mographic, spatial, and migration trends in conjunction with developmental 
trends, drawing from both official population statistics (mainly the 2000 
census) and more than a year of cumulated fieldwork in western China from 
2003 to 2007. (See the methodological appendix for detail on the methods 
and data used.) The first section discusses salient issues raised by the debate: 
the demographic transition in Tibet, the precise spatial delineation of Tibet, 
and the spatial distributions of ethnic populations within this delineated ter-
ritory. The second section examines the balance between migration and local 
demographic trends and reflects on the extent of exclusion faced by Tibetans 
in urban employment. The conclusion takes issue with the proposition that 
ethnic inequality is a reflection of an urban bias transposed on the rurality of 
Tibet, arguing that this logic distracts attention from power relations rooted 
in urban areas. 
Clarifying the debate
Given that population has become a key symbol in the politicized debate 
over Tibet, many of the assertions about population made by both sides have 
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been blurred by political posturing and ideology, requiring that we put all 
of the arguments into context. One terminological clarification is necessary 
before starting, however. The Tibetan Autonomous Region usually receives 
most of the attention in these debates, particularly from the Chinese side, for 
both political and practical reasons. Politically, Beijing insists that the “Tibet 
Question” is only about the TAR and not the other Tibetan areas in China, 
even though the latter account for almost half of the Tibetan areas and more 
than half of the Tibetan population in China. Practically, the official popula-
tion censuses and surveys of the TAR represent a mostly Tibetan population, 
unlike Qinghai, the province with the next-highest proportion of Tibetans 
in its population, where Han Chinese nonetheless dominate the population 
and thus the survey results. Because detailed time-series data are usually 
only available at a provincial level of aggregation, the TAR tends to be used 
to represent Tibet by default. 
This approach is arguably valid for the representation of broad struc-
tural patterns and trends, at least with respect to rural areas, in light of strong 
similarities across Tibetan areas and stark differences between these areas and 
elsewhere in China in terms of topography, population density, patterns of 
land use and livelihood, education levels, and health indexes.12 Nonetheless, 
from the standpoint of the issues addressed here, it is important to understand 
all of the Tibetan areas in a systemic manner, given that their political and 
social realities are distinct from those of the rest of China. Creative extrapola-
tion is required to circumvent data limitations in order to avoid acquiescing 
a priori to certain political positions within the conflict. 
Population growth and demographic transition 
Life expectancy in the Tibet Autonomous Region, by official estimates, 
doubled to 64 years between 1951 and 2000. The Tibetan population of the 
TAR nearly doubled, reaching 2.43 million in 2000.13 The Tibetan populations 
outside the TAR experienced similar trends. The total Tibetan population 
in China reached 5.42 million according to the 2000 census, including 1.27 
million Tibetans in Sichuan, 1.09 million in Qinghai, 0.44 million in Gansu, 
and 0.13 million in Yunnan (Tabulation 2002: Table 2-5). The changes since 
1951 are at best estimates or even guesswork since most of the TAR and many 
remote Tibetan areas outside the TAR were not directly enumerated in either 
the 1953 or the 1964 censuses. As a result, the 1982 census is the first broadly 
accurate record available on the Tibetan population.14 
While the increase in life expectancy is commendable, the level was 
about the same as the average for all developing countries in 1998, at 65 
years according to the World Bank (2002). Similar advances took place in 
neighboring Himalayan countries. For instance, life expectancy in Bhutan 
was estimated by the United Nations at 62 years for males and 64.5 years 
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for females in 2000–05. Indeed, the comparison to Bhutan is informative 
because, with conditions similar to Tibet, comparable levels of health indica-
tors (official in both cases) have been achieved under an entirely different 
political framework, albeit Bhutan is heavily subsidized by India, just as the 
TAR is by Beijing. In India the respective life expectancies were 63.2 years 
for males and 64.6 years for females. Even in conflict-ridden Nepal, one of 
the most impoverished countries in Asia, the levels were 60.1 and 59.6 years 
(UN 2002). Similarly, rapid population growth itself is a consequence of the 
late onset of demographic transition, as observed generally in developing 
countries over the same period regardless of their level of development.15 
Tibetans have clearly entered the demographic transition, contrary to 
simplistic explanations sometimes given for the lagging development of Ti-
bet.16 This fact has been well established in the literature on Tibetan demog-
raphy. Death rates probably started to fall in the 1950s due to the expansion 
of modern public health care in Tibetan areas following their absorption into 
the PRC, although the exact magnitude and timing are difficult to ascertain.17 
Improvements were also probably interrupted by the period of uprising, 
counterinsurgency, famine, and social upheaval in the late 1950s and early 
1960s.18 Nonetheless, by the late 1960s, sustained improvements in mortality 
and life expectancy were evident across Tibet, though with a significant lag 
behind China.19 Total fertility rates (TFRs) in the TAR, by official estimates, 
peaked at around 5.5 births per woman in 1968, fell below 5.0 in the 1970s, 
rose to a lower peak of about 5.0 in the early 1980s, and fell gradually after 
1982 and then sharply from the late 1980s onward (Zhang and Zhang 1994: 
54; Childs 2008: 202).20 The TFR in the TAR was 4.2 in the 1990 census and 
1.9 in the 2000 census (Childs et al. 2005: 343). In Qinghai, TFRs in the more 
central Tibetan autonomous prefectures were below replacement in the 2000 
census, namely 1.7 for Malho and Tsolho and 1.8 for Tsojang, while they were 
above replacement only in the two most remote nomadic prefectures, 2.3 for 
Golog and 2.7 for Yushu (Qinghai Tabulation 2002: Table L.6-1). 
These findings are supported by data from the 2000 census on the age 
structure of all Tibetans in China (see Figure 2). These are almost identical 
to the equivalent data for the TAR analyzed in this journal by Childs et al. 
(2005: 341), except the total number of Tibetans is more than doubled. In 
both sets of data, the largest age cohort was aged 10–14 years and the size 
of the younger cohorts tapered off, indicating that demographic momentum 
had reached its peak among Tibetans in the mid to late 1980s, both inside 
and outside the TAR. 
To assuage concerns that such official data have been concocted or ma-
nipulated, it may be noted that the fertility transition is also self-evident in 
the field. For instance, declining fertility rates were reflected in a demographic 
survey of 13 farming villages in the TAR by Goldstein et al. (2002), where 
TFRs dropped from 6.4 in 1986 to under 2.0 in 1998 (calculated in Childs et 
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al. 2005: 343). My own qualitative field observations in the Tibetan areas of 
Qinghai suggest similar trends. In other words, all indications suggest that 
Tibetans inside and outside the TAR are currently well advanced along the 
demographic transition, to an extent that total fertility rates are now below 
replacement levels in all but the remotest areas. 
Rates of natural increase (shown in Figure 3) clarify these processes of 
demographic transition in comparison to the rest of China. The rate in the 
TAR (mostly Tibetan) was considerably lower than that for China as a whole 
(mostly Han) up to the early 1970s, was about the same rate in the late 1970s 
and 1980s, and was considerably higher since 1989.21 The similarity of the 
TAR and China in the late 1970s and 1980s reflects the fact that lower TFRs 
among the Han (compared to the rates cited above for Tibetans) were coun-
terbalanced by the Han’s greater population momentum from the baby boom 
in the 1960s following the famine of the Great Leap Forward. In China, the 
rate of natural increase peaked in 1987 and gradually declined thereafter. In 
the TAR, the rate peaked in 1983 and then again in 1990, after which it also 
gradually declined, albeit more slowly than in China until the late 1990s. 
These demographic differentials between Tibetans and Han are explained 
by a variety of structural, sociological, and policy factors, rather than by any 
intrinsic or “backward” demographic behavior on the part of the Tibetans, 
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FIGURE 2   The Tibetan population of China, all provinces, by age
and sex, 2000
SOURCE: CPSY 2003: Table 2-1.
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contrary to what is often implied by some Chinese demographers.22 Family 
planning policies usually receive most of the attention, although from the 
perspective of the politicized debates on population in Tibet, their influence 
is in fact counterintuitive given that birth limits are leniently applied toward 
China’s minorities. As discussed above, TFRs rose in the TAR at the beginning 
of the reform period, even while they continued to fall in China as a whole 
because of the implementation of the one-child policy. Even into the 2000s, 
the official birth limit for minorities in China is two children, rather than the 
one-child limit applied to Han Chinese, and in many parts of Tibet even this 
two-child limit is only applied to urban dwellers.23 These limits have nonethe-
less contributed to fertility declines, particularly with increased enforcement 
since the mid-1990s, as analyzed by Goldstein et al. (2002) and Childs et al. 
(2005: 347). As a result, fertility transition among Tibetans has accelerated 
since the late 1980s, though with a lag behind the Han Chinese.
These insights are often greeted with incredulity by exiled Tibetans, 
given their own allegations that the PRC has required Tibetan women to un-
dergo sterilizations and abortions. Falling fertility might be taken as evidence 
of overzealous family planning, although many of these allegations conflate 
birth limitation with forced sterilizations and abortions, whereas the former 
does not necessarily imply the latter.24 The charges of forced sterilizations and 
abortions were investigated by Goldstein et al. (2002), who concluded that 
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FIGURE 3   Crude birth rates (CBR), crude death rates (CDR), and rates of
natural increase (RNI), China and Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR)
1965–2003 (years 1965–78 not to scale)
SOURCES: CSY 2004: Table 4-2; CSY 1999: Table 4-2; TSY 2004: Table 3-2.
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their fertility data from 13 villages in the TAR suggest no general program of 
forced birth control (ibid.: 25). However, many of the allegations of abusive 
forced birth control refer to Tibetan areas outside the TAR, albeit mostly with 
reference to the 1980s and early 1990s. My qualitative field insights in the 
Tibetan areas of Qinghai tend to support the conclusion that cases of forced 
sterilizations and abortions do not represent a generalized policy approach but 
were probably related to events in specific localities or to specific brief periods 
of policy zealousness.25 Moreover, the overall rate of natural increase for Qin-
ghai has been consistently similar to that of the TAR, both the highest in the 
country; and, as noted above, TFRs for the Tibetan autonomous prefectures 
of Qinghai were similar to those of the TAR in the 2000 census.
It is therefore likely that family planning has also been relatively lenient 
in many minority areas of Qinghai, as suggested by the findings of Goldstein 
et al. mentioned above, although leniency varies from locality to locality. 
For instance, Tibetans whom I interviewed in 2004 from Tsolho (in Chinese: 
Hainan) Prefecture in Qinghai or from Tibetan counties in Gansu reported 
very strict implementation in these areas, with fines of 1,000 yuan for a third 
child, and 3,000 yuan and imprisonment for a fourth. Meanwhile, Tibetans 
interviewed in nearby Chentsa (Ch: Jianza) County in Qinghai did not report 
any penalties beyond token fines of 100 yuan for a fifth child. Birth control 
regulations seemed very lax or even ignored in many of the remote pastoral 
areas of Qinghai, such as in Golok and Yushu Prefectures, where large young 
families with five or more children were still common, apparently with little 
or no penalties. 
The point here is not to make a judgment about the abusiveness of Chi-
nese family planning policies in Tibet, but rather to show that there is nothing 
surprising or sinister in the demographic trends of the Tibetan areas. Relative 
to the rest of China, slower declines in fertility and crude birth rates since 
the 1980s have been consistent with a more lenient family planning regime 
in minority areas. Specific cases of abusive family planning methods do not 
seem to have had much of an impact on these broader trends, although, as 
noted above, stricter implementation of birth limits in the 1990s definitely 
bolstered the speed of the decline. 
Rather, consistent with recent theoretical work on demographic transi-
tions, sustained mortality decline would seem to be the key remote causal fac-
tor determining fertility transitions (for instance, see Dyson 2001). Although 
research on this issue is limited for Tibet, one can plausibly suggest that both 
the timing of the fertility transition in Tibet and its subsequent lagging behind 
the rest of China until the late 1990s were the result of mortality declines in 
the 1960s and 1970s that, although sustained, were much weaker than those 
in the rest of China. While birth control policies also influenced trends, the 
sharpest reductions in fertility in China were witnessed in the 1970s before 
the introduction of the one-child policy. These reductions were probably more 
fundamentally facilitated by a sharp mortality decline up to 1970, rather than 
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by the coerciveness of subsequent family planning policies (see Hussain et al. 
2006). Moreover, along with family planning measures, other proximate fac-
tors would have moderated the timing and speed of the fertility transition in 
Tibet once underway, as analyzed at length by Childs (2008: 233–252). Indeed, 
Childs finds that demographic trends among Tibetans in the TAR and Tibetan 
refugees in South Asia are remarkably similar in both timing and magnitude 
despite the fact that the two groups live under completely different political, 
economic, and social conditions and the exile community is pronatal. In sum, 
the seemingly contradictory perspectives on population in Tibet can in fact be 
understood as various aspects of these transitional demographic processes.
Minority or majority? Spatial delineations  
and distributions
Population growth aside, the assertions by exiles that Tibetans are becoming 
a minority in their homeland, or have already become a minority in certain 
regions, should also be taken with a grain of salt. Two spatial issues must be 
considered: one is the precise delineation of “Tibet,” the other is the rural–ur-
ban distribution of ethnic populations within these delineated areas. 
The delineation of Tibet in the borderlands where eastern Tibet meets 
western China proper is critical to any ethnic population count because of 
the sudden changes in topography, ethnicity, and population density that 
occur within frontier counties. Key in this regard is the northeast corner of 
Qinghai, namely, Xining District and Haidong District, the area between the 
capital cities of Xining and Lanzhou. These two districts account for about 2.8 
percent of the provincial land area; the five Tibetan autonomous prefectures 
(TAPs) and one Tibetan–Mongolian autonomous prefecture (TMAP) ac-
count for the remaining 97.2 percent. The exile government usually defines 
Xining and Haidong Districts as part of Tibet, reflecting the fact that much 
of the area was historically composed of Tibetan farming and pastoral com-
munities, albeit intermixed with Muslim farming communities and some 
Han Chinese garrison settlements. The current Dalai Lama was born in this 
region, although it was controlled by a Muslim warlord at the time. Even 
today, both Xining and Haidong contain a patchwork of Tibetan counties, 
townships, and religious centers, and together account for about one-quarter 
of the total Tibetan population of Qinghai Province in 2000 (calculated from 
Qinghai Tabulation 2002). Regardless of the legitimacy of historical claims, 
both districts were the main destinations of Chinese migration to the province 
following the creation of Qinghai in 1928 and especially during the 1950s 
and 1960s. As a result, today these two districts are relatively urbanized and 
account for two-thirds of Qinghai’s population, largely Han with a Muslim 
minority (QSY 2005: Table 4-4). 
Outside this core northeast area of Qinghai, the bulk of the remaining 
Han population in Qinghai is concentrated in several strategic pockets of Chi-
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nese interest, such as the mining towns of northern and western Qinghai (Hai-
bei TAP and Haixi TMAP). Both prefectures are arid and largely composed of 
desert but offer a rich supply of minerals and hydrocarbons. Haixi in particular 
includes the mineral-rich Tsaidam (Ch: Qaidamu) Basin, which became infa-
mous in 1999 when the “Qinghai Project” of the World Bank came under con-
certed attack by the Tibetan Government in Exile and Tibet Support Groups 
for promoting population-transfer policies. Mineral resource development in 
these areas has resulted in the rapid expansion of several mining towns since 
the 1950s, populated mostly by Han, whose numbers dwarf the indigenous 
and extremely sparse populations of nomadic Tibetans and Mongolians. 
Leaving aside the historically contested northeast corner of Qinghai and 
the mining areas, which are exceptional cases with little applicability outside 
the highly mineralized north and west of the province, the rest of Qinghai is 
essentially Tibetan. Tibetans accounted for 66 percent of the population of 
Malho TAP in the 2000 census, 63 percent of Tsolho TAP, 92 percent of Golog 
TAP, and 97 percent of Yushu TAP. Outside Qinghai, Tibetans accounted for 
54 percent of Ngawa TQAP (Tibetan–Qiang Autonomous Prefecture) and 78 
percent of Kardze TAP, both in Sichuan, and 51 percent of Gannan TAP in 
Gansu (calculated from county-level tabulations). If we include the pockets 
of closely related Mongolian and Mongour (Ch: Tu) minorities in Qinghai, 
and the Qiang in Sichuan—all three of which are Tibetan-speaking, Tibetan 
Buddhist, and mostly rural—it is clear that indigenous Tibetan Buddhists are 
a large majority in these prefectures, and overwhelmingly so in the rural ar-
eas, similar to the situation in the TAR. Debates on population shares rarely 
distinguish this point. 
Precise delineation therefore becomes critical for a proper evaluation of 
the actual Chinese population within the definitively Tibetan areas. The ex-
ercise is complicated by the fact that borderland counties often contain mixed 
ethnic groups. In such cases, a higher-density population of non-Tibetans in 
the lowlands of a county can appear to overwhelm the sparser population 
in the Tibetan highlands, even though the two zones usually remain highly 
segregated. This scenario applies to much of Haidong in Qinghai as well as 
to the essentially Han-populated lowlands of the counties in eastern Kardze 
TAP and Ngawa TQAP in Sichuan. For instance, the epicenter of the 12 May 
2008 earthquake in Sichuan was in Wenchuan County, located in Ngawa 
TQAP, although the casualties were mostly Han Chinese in the urbanized 
lowlands of this county.26 
Considered in this way, Tibetans are clearly not a minority in most 
Tibetan areas. If anything, they are a large majority, albeit one that is pre-
dominantly rural and thus not highly visible. This leads us to the second 
spatial issue. It is clear from the 2000 census that the main ethnic population 
schisms boil down to sharp differences in urbanization levels rather than to 
differences in population shares. Tibetans were overwhelmingly rural in all 
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five of the Chinese provinces that incorporate Tibetan areas, with 87.2 percent 
living in rural areas in China overall (see Table 1). Tibetan urbanization rates 
ranged from 8.6 percent in Qinghai, 9.1 percent in Gansu, and 10.5 percent 
in Sichuan, to 15.2 percent in the TAR and 20 percent in Yunnan. In con-
trast, the urbanization rate among the recorded Han was 79.5 percent in the 
TAR and 44.7 percent in Qinghai, both higher than the national average of 
36.9 percent. Hui Muslims were 79.7 percent urban in the TAR, where their 
presence is small, and 29.7 percent urban in Qinghai, where they account 
for about one-sixth of the population. The Qinghai Hui were less urbanized 
than the Qinghai Han but much more urbanized than the Qinghai Tibetans. 
The extremely high rates of urbanization among the Han and Hui in the TAR 
reflect their lack of an indigenous base in the rural areas, as is discussed fur-
ther in the next section. 
Furthermore, the Han and Muslim presence is more concentrated 
in cities than in towns, whereas urban Tibetans are more concentrated in 
towns than in cities, particularly outside the TAR. This is shown in Table 1, 
TABLE 1 Distribution of the population by selected ethnic group in 
the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and in Qinghai and Sichuan 
Provinces, 2000
 Percent of ethnic group Percent of total population 
 located in   by ethnic group in
 Rural   Rural 
 areas Towns Cities areas Towns Cities
TAR
Total population 80.6 11.1 8.3
Tibetans 84.8 9.4 5.8 97.6 78.3 65.0 
Han 20.5 35.5 44.0 1.5 19.4 32.1 
Hui Muslims 20.3 25.6 54.0 0.1 0.8 2.2 
Qinghai
Total population 67.7 11.7 20.7
Tibetans (+M & Mong)a 91.4 6.7 1.9 37.6 17.4 3.5 
Han 55.3 13.6 31.1 44.2 62.9 81.3 
Muslims (Hui & Salar) 70.3 12.8 17.0 18.1 19.1 14.3 
Sichuan
Total population 72.9 12.3 14.8
Tibetan (+Qiang)b 89.5 9.5 0.9 2.3 1.5 0.1
Han 72.0 12.5 15.5 93.8 97.1 99.0
Yi 94.1 4.4 1.5 3.3 0.9 0.3
Tibetans in China 87.2 8.7 4.1
aRow measures urbanization rates of Tibetans only, but includes Mongours (Ch: Tu) and Mongolians in the mea-
sure of shares in order to evaluate the weight of indigenous Tibeto-Buddhists in rural, town, and city. 
bRow includes the Qiang in shares but not in urbanization rates; the urbanization rate among the Qiang is only 2 
percent more than the Sichuan Tibetans, or 12.5 percent. 
SOURCE: 2000 census. Calculated from Tabulation (2002: Tables 1-6, 1-6a, 1-6b, and 1-6c).
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which focuses on the TAR, Qinghai, and Sichuan (accounting for 88 percent 
of Tibetans in China). The town–city dimension reflects the fact that most 
urban jurisdictions in the Tibetan areas are classified as towns, with Lhasa 
and Shigatse in the TAR being the notable exceptions. It is also probable that 
rural Tibetans tend to migrate first to local towns rather than to more distant 
and expensive cities, except in cases related to tertiary education, which is 
concentrated in the capital city of each province. 
It is clear from Table 1 that Tibetans have remained predominantly rural. 
Rates of change are not shown: temporal comparisons of urbanization rates 
are difficult if not meaningless because urban definitions are quite different 
in each of the five censuses in China (see Zhou and Ma 2003). It is also clear, 
however, that rapid urban growth up to 2000 was disproportionately filled 
by Han, and to a lesser extent by Muslims in the case of Qinghai, relative to 
their overall population share. Current inter-provincial migration (or intra-
provincial in the case of Tibetan areas outside the TAR) accentuates these 
differences, given that the destination of most Han and Muslim migrants to 
the Tibetan areas is urban, as discussed in the next section. Although the Han 
and Muslim population shares may be small in these Tibetan areas, this share 
is concentrated in the urban areas, precisely where it is most visible. 
Moreover, minority dominance in rural areas is notable. The combined 
total of minority nationalities in Qinghai (predominantly Tibetan and Hui 
Muslims) gives them a majority in rural areas, even before isolating minor-
ity areas from the core Han areas. Given demographic momentum among 
both Tibetans and Muslims, this pattern is likely to continue. In the TAR, the 
contrast between the rurality of Tibetans and the urbanity of the Han and 
Hui is extreme. Therefore, the key issue is not the overall population balance 
between Tibetans and outsiders, but the fact that outsiders have dominated 
urbanization. Overall, Han population shares in Tibetan areas outside the 
TAR may have been decreasing since the 1980s. This is not the case in the 
TAR, where their share has been definitely increasing, but the increase has 
been from very low levels. The reasons for this apparent incongruity with 
claims of population invasion asserted by Tibetan exiles are explored in the 
following section. 
Population shares reconsidered
Regardless of misinterpretations, the exile—and predominant Tibetan—view 
of population invasion harbors legitimate concerns and is partially valid, al-
though only with respect to Tibetan urban areas. Only in the main Tibetan 
cities and towns can it be argued that Han are outnumbering Tibetans, or at 
least matching their numbers. Nonetheless, the Tibetan dominance in the 
Tibetan rural areas itself refutes the claim of overall population swamping 
through simple arithmetic: even if the Han become numerically dominant 
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in urban populations, in most cases their urban dominance would not even 
come close to compensating for the Tibetans’ dominance in rural areas. This 
would hold even if the Han population count were significantly underesti-
mated. Ironically, the perception of population swamping is essentially an 
urban-centric assessment, even while the Tibetan areas remain some of the 
most rural in China. Yet this is precisely why the issue is highly problematic 
given that it reflects perceptions of exclusionary dynamics experienced in 
urban areas.
Migration
Returning to the historical symbols of population invasion, important fea-
tures differentiate the experience of the Tibetan areas from those of Inner 
Mongolia, Xinjiang, and the northeast core of Qinghai. Han migration to In-
ner Mongolia was largely agrarian and took place as early as the eighteenth 
century, at a time when rural wealth was still coveted by migrants in China. 
Mongolians were already a minority in Inner Mongolia by the end of the 
nineteenth century, when population transfer for the purpose of land colo-
nization became official policy under the Qing Dynasty. The agrarian focus of 
such policies meant that Han migrants settled in the countryside and became 
dominant in rural as well as urban populations. Thus, by 1947 Mongolians 
accounted for only about 14 percent of the population of Inner Mongolia. 
This share dropped further to 11 percent by 1964 during the peak of Maoist 
population transfer policies. The share had slowly rebounded to 13.5 percent 
by 1985 (Burjgin and Bilik 2003: 55–56). As noted at the outset, the share 
reached 17 percent in the 2000 census. Similarly, the large-scale population 
transfers that expanded the share of Han from 6 percent to over 40 percent 
of the population in Xinjiang and from around 50 percent to over 60 percent 
in Qinghai took place during the heydays of Maoism from the 1950s to the 
1970s (QSY 2005: Tables 4-3 and 4-5).
In contrast, rural or agrarian population transfer never took hold in the 
Tibetan rural areas, in large part owing to the failures of agrarian colonization 
in the 1950s and 1960s. In particular, attempts to convert high-altitude range-
lands into large-scale collective farms led to significant desertification in sev-
eral Tibetan areas.27 In the case of Qinghai, Goodman (2004) notes that large 
transfers from 1956 to 1959 were matched by an almost equally large exodus 
following the famine of the Great Leap Forward. Similarly, in-migration during 
the Cultural Revolution was balanced for the most part by out-migration over 
the same period (ibid.: 386–388). Thus, the Chinese plans in the 1950s to reach 
a population of 10 million people in Qinghai by 1967 were singularly unsuc-
cessful; by 1978, the population of Qinghai had reached only 3.65 million (QSY 
2005: Table 3-1). This demonstrates the importance of differentiating between 
rhetoric and reality in China’s population transfer policies. 
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As a result of similar policy failures throughout Tibet, Tibetan rural areas 
have remained mostly Tibetan, with few exceptions aside from strategic or 
borderland locations.28 Conversely, the Han in most Tibetan areas are concen-
trated chiefly in towns and cities. Similarly, the destination of most new Han 
migrants is urban (or peri-urban in the case of greenhouse agriculture). There 
is little or no incentive for this to change in view of the poverty and harshness 
of Tibetan rural areas (in the eyes of the lowland Chinese), and the fact that 
most land is already fully utilized, with little potential for commercial farm-
ing or ranching given the ecological sensitivity of the region. This is a critical 
difference with Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and even Xining and Haidong in 
Qinghai, where Han populations were well entrenched in the rural areas by 
the advent of the reform period in the late 1970s.
Furthermore, the concept of transfer—in the sense of organized large-
scale movements of population from one region to another—would apply 
only in a general sense up to the end of the Maoist period in 1978, during 
which population movements were controlled and managed closely by 
the state. Since the beginning of the reform period, this control has been 
gradually liberalized, with the result that the principal trend in population 
movements has been away from rural areas and poor peripheral regions and 
toward towns, cities, and coastal areas of China. As in most other countries, 
this trend has been reinforced by the declining economic importance of ag-
riculture, rapid population growth, and the consequent underemployment 
of rural labor.
Population movement since the reform period, particularly since the 
early 1990s, has been more or less voluntary, implying that policies must rely 
on incentives rather than command to instigate migration. The trend since 
the 1980s has been a net population outflow from the impoverished western 
areas of China. The Tibetan areas, some of the most impoverished, are not 
strangers to this outflow. Indeed, the propensity to move from such areas 
would tend to be stronger among Han, given that they are not indigenous to 
Tibet, they are more urbanized and mobile, many were forced to move there 
in the first place, most maintain connections with other areas of China, and 
many complain of the harshness of the climate and altitude. Thus, by nature 
Han are more apt to (re)integrate into mainstream Chinese society. Current 
Tibetan refugee migration to India can also be understood in this context, 
given that many of such Tibetans migrate with the perception that better 
fortune might be attainable in exile.29 
The only factors counteracting this overall migration trend are the heav-
ily government-subsidized incentives and opportunities for Han, Tibetan, and 
Muslim workers and businesspeople to move to and settle in Tibet. None-
theless, net outflow has been the rule for much of the reform period despite 
incentives. For instance, registered net migration to the TAR was negative in 
every year but three from 1981 to 1992 (Iredale et al. 2001: 151). The great-
est outflows took place in 1981–82 owing to a change in cadre policy that 
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allowed many Han cadres to return home and increased the representation 
of local Tibetan cadres (Huang 1995). Outward flows were no doubt fueled 
by recession in the TAR up to the early 1990s, and net inflows only resumed 
sometime in the mid-1990s following the heavily subsidized recovery of the 
TAR economy (see Fischer 2005). In Qinghai, registered net outflows started 
in 1980 and remained consistently negative from 1986 until 2004 (the latest 
data consulted), with peaks occurring between 1988 and 1993 (QSY 2005: 
Table 4-3). In both periods, it can be assumed that the bulk of the outflow 
was Han.30 
These statistics refer to officially registered moves, that is, those recorded 
by Public Security Departments. They therefore relate to changes in the non-
military31 population who have permanent or other forms of long-term resi-
dential status, whereas many migrants operate under a variety of temporary 
statuses.32 It might thus be argued that the preceding data on net migration 
do not fully reflect reality, inasmuch as the majority of Han in the Tibetan 
areas are temporary migrants, even by official measures.33 Indeed, on top of 
the difficulties of measuring temporary migrants, the political sensitivity of the 
presence of migrants in the TAR adds further problems in light of the motiva-
tion for the government to hide or disguise the scale of Han in-migration.34 
Resolving this measurement problem requires a degree of creative ex-
trapolation. This can be achieved by comparing annual population surveys 
with the 2000 population census. The population surveys are conducted 
among permanently residing households and exclude temporary migrants. 
This introduces a bias in the surveys depending on whether a province experi-
ences a net inflow or outflow of population. Populations in inflow provinces 
are underestimated because migrants are not usually registered as permanent 
residents. Populations in outflow provinces are overestimated because tem-
porary migrants usually maintain permanent status in their source provinces, 
a fact that exaggerates the baseline residency records used for population 
survey estimates. In contrast, the 2000 census went to great lengths to re-
cord temporary residents and represents the most accurate portrait of actual 
provincial populations to date.35 
Although it is difficult to measure temporary migrants in China, the 
discrepancy between the two sources can allow one to indirectly infer net 
inflows or outflows in a way that was not intended in either source. Accord-
ing to the above logic, the 2000 census population count should exceed the 
1999 survey count (plus population growth) in net inflow provinces and 
fall below it in net outflow provinces. In several of the strategic and sparsely 
populated far western provinces, the two trends of inflow and outflow over-
lap and create a churning effect. Migrants from other provinces, whether 
state-organized or “spontaneous,” usually come for short periods and do 
not necessarily change their registration status to the host province, even if 
residency rules are considerably more lax than in the coastal areas. On the 
other hand, this inward flow overlaps with the out-migration of previous 
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temporary in-migrants and, to a lesser extent, of locals. Although out-mi-
gration receives less attention, it is a considerable source of concern for local 
authorities, particularly with respect to the more skilled or better-educated 
out-migrants, as several local officials indicated to me in interviews in Qing-
hai. During a period of increasing government spending, inflows potentially 
outweigh outflows, in which case the surveys would underestimate the actual 
population and would be lower than the census population count. The results 
of this inferential analysis are presented in Table 2. 
Guangdong in the southeast stands out as the quintessential inflow 
province, whereas Guizhou, the poorest province of China, is the most ex-
treme case of an outflow province. Both are intuitive results. Xinjiang also 
stands out as an inflow province, supporting allegations of large-scale in-
migration. On the other hand, both the TAR and Qinghai appear relatively 
stable. In both cases, the proportional difference between the 2000 census and 
the 1999 survey is less than one percentage point above the rate of natural 
increase in 1999 (Columns E and G in Table 2). Measurement errors could 
account for much of this difference. Indeed, Qinghai recorded the largest 
estimated census error at 7.4 percent (Column F), indicating that the final ad-
justed census population, after a post-census survey was conducted, was 7.4 
percent greater than the original census tabulation. If the original tabulated 
population is considered (Column C), Qinghai clearly appears as a net out-
flow province.36 Despite the evident visibility of in-migration to the Tibetan 
areas, these observations point to the conclusion that such migration involves 
considerable churning, rather than sustained inflows as in Xinjiang.
As noted above, the common rebuttal to this observation is that Han 
migrants are underestimated in the Tibetan areas because of the sensitivity 
of their presence, particularly in the TAR. For instance, the 2000 census re-
corded only 158,570 Han in the TAR (Tabulation 2002: Table 1-6), a number 
that is treated with disbelief by most observers. Yet despite a similar sensitiv-
ity, an underestimation of the Han population in Xinjiang is not apparent in 
the census data, which unequivocally show a massive inflow from outside 
the province. Also, the TAR aside, an inflow of Han into western provinces 
such as Qinghai is not necessarily treated as a subject to be avoided by local 
officials. On the contrary, it is often interpreted as an indication of the success 
of attempts to attract skilled labor and to stem outflow, thus supporting the 
developmental goal of building human resources. 
In the case of the TAR, the Han census count was obviously an under-
shot. Arguments of statistical manipulation aside, there may be several rea-
sons why the Han count was low. Temporary migration is not necessarily one 
of them. In fact, as noted above, the 2000 census attempted to record all types 
of migrants, including those who had not yet resolved their residency status. 
The only migrants who would not have been counted were either those who 
had hidden from the census takers (which is more of a consideration in the 
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coastal areas given official belligerence toward migrants, but less in the west 
where migration is encouraged), or those who were missed because of the 
difficulties of tracking migrants as opposed to permanent residents.
On the other hand, timing is critical. The census was taken in Novem-
ber, when most of the seasonal Han migrants would already have left for the 
winter. The figure of 158,570 may therefore represent a reasonable count of 
the number of non-military Han who were actually residing year-round in 
the TAR in 2000. Also, military personnel would represent a significant pro-
portion of the visual presence of Han in Lhasa and in other cities and towns. 
Conversely, informal evaluations by tourists and journalists are made mostly 
during the summer months, when the Han presence is swollen by tourism. 
Most Chinese tourists, whose numbers apparently reached 1.6 million in 2005 
and over 4 million in 2007, visit the TAR between May and September (see 
Xinhua 2006; PD 2008).
TABLE 2 Selected province-level population statistics, c. 2000
       Rate of 
       natural 
 Population (in millions) according to   increase, 
     Discrepancies 1999 
  2000  2000  (percent)  survey 
 1999 adjusted census 2001   (per 
 survey census tabulation survey (B–A)/A (B–C)/C 1000)
 A B C D E F G
Inflow provinces
Guangdong 72.70 86.42 85.23 77.83 18.9 1.4 9.92
Shanghai 14.74 16.74 16.41 16.14 13.6 2.0 –1.10
Xinjiang 17.74 19.25 18.46 18.76 8.5 4.3 11.80
Fujian 33.16 34.71 34.10 34.40 4.7 1.8 5.21
Stable provinces
Ningxia 5.43 5.62 5.49 5.63 3.5 2.4 12.32
TAR 2.56 2.62 2.62 2.63 2.3 0.2 15.80
Yunnan 41.92 42.88 42.36 42.87 2.3 1.2 11.66
Qinghai 5.10 5.18 4.82 5.23 1.6 7.4 13.90
Inner Mongolia 23.62 23.76 23.32 23.77 0.5 1.9 7.24
Gansu 25.43 25.62 25.12 25.75 0.7 2.0 9.17
Outflow provinces
Shaanxi 36.18 36.05 35.37 36.59 –0.3 1.9 6.13
Sichuan  85.50 83.29 82.35 86.40 –2.6 1.1 6.78
Guizhou 37.10 35.25 35.25 37.99 –5.0 0.0 14.24
National 1,259.09 1,265.83 1,242.61 1,276.27 0.5 1.9 8.77
NOTE: See text on categorization of inflow, stable, and outflow provinces. Column B, the “2000 adjusted census,” repre-
sents the official estimated population after adjustments were made following the post-census survey. Column F indicates 
the estimated census error. 
SOURCES: Calculated from CSY 2000: Table 4-3; CSY 2001: Table 4-3; and CSY 2002: Tables 4-3 and 4-8.
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Although there has been a clear increase in temporary Han migration 
to the TAR since the mid-1990s, particularly during the summer months in 
parallel with tourism, such migration is not stable. It is to be differentiated 
from the case of Xinjiang in that Han migrants by and large do not settle 
over the long term. For instance, surveys taken in the TAR in the mid-1990s 
indicated that most Han migrants concentrated on economic activities in the 
TAR for a temporary period, perhaps five to six years on average (Iredale et 
al. 2001: 156–158). These insights were reconfirmed in a 2005 survey by Ma 
and Lhundrup (2006). My own field observations from Lhasa suggest that 
many Chinese migrants in the TAR are seasonal, particularly since the massive 
boom in tourism that began in the early 2000s. Given these characteristics, 
Han migration would tend to be very susceptible to changes in social and eco-
nomic conditions, such as the March 2008 protests and one-day riot in Lhasa, 
which subsequently caused a sharp fall in tourism (PD 2008). This probably 
had the knock-on effect of reducing the tourism-related seasonal migration 
flows as well. Conversely, rapidly increasing subsidies, which have been in 
effect since the mid-1990s, obviously encourage net inflows. Indeed, despite 
contentions that the Qinghai–Tibet railway, completed in 2006, will acceler-
ate in-migration, increased inflows are more likely related to ongoing policies 
of subsidization rather than to the easing of transport per se. The question 
remains, however, whether net inflows could be sustained in the long run if 
and when subsidies stabilize or social stability declines. The underlying trend 
would suggest that inflows face an uphill battle against the counter-current 
of outflows. 
Structural transformations in the regional economy could also increase 
out-migration of both Tibetans and Han from certain counties, even while 
increasing in-migration to others. For instance, local governments in the Ti-
betan areas of Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan are much more fiscally 
austere than in the TAR. They are often left with few fiscal means to stem an 
outflow of labor in the event of a collapse in a key industry; for instance, the 
1998 moratorium on forestry activities declared by the national government 
in response to flooding on the Yangtze had a debilitating impact on many 
Tibetan counties in Sichuan and Yunnan. Therefore, one cannot assume that 
the migration pattern of the TAR represents the norm in the Tibetan areas 
outside the TAR, given that the former is primarily a response to massive 
subsidies. 
Han migration versus Tibetan natural increase
As noted above, most rural areas of Tibet remain overwhelmingly Tibetan, 
along with pockets of several other closely related ethnicities. For instance, 
97.6 percent of the TAR’s rural population in the 2000 census was Tibetan 
(Table 1). Even if the Han population of the province were underestimated, 
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the underestimation would relate mostly to the urban areas and would 
scarcely affect this rural share. Even in eastern Tibetan areas that are rela-
tively close to such large cities as Xining, Lanzhou, and Chengdu, rural pop-
ulations in the decisively Tibetan areas also remain predominantly Tibetan. 
This was consistently confirmed to me in my fieldwork. It can also be shown 
through a county-by-county examination of the 2000 census, beyond the 
scope of this article. 
Because fertility and birth rates are considerably higher in the rural ar-
eas, the Tibetan population holds the upper hand in the demographic contest. 
This demographic advantage is amplified by Tibetans’ low levels of urbaniza-
tion, given that rural dwellers have more lenient birth limits, and by their 
younger age structure, with 31.2 percent of the TAR population under age 15 
in the 2000 census, versus 22.9 percent in China (CPSY 2002: Table 2-6). As 
these youth cohorts enter their reproductive years with the two-child limit 
presumably still in place, they will sustain higher rates of natural increase 
relative to the Han for at least the next 20 to 30 years. In contrast, the few 
Han who settle permanently in the Tibetan areas mostly follow the urban 
Chinese demographic profile of one child per family. Han who migrate on a 
temporary or seasonal basis are disproportionately male (with the exception 
of sex workers), of working age, and tend not to bring their families with 
them during their working sojourns (see Ma and Lhundup 2006). While these 
attributes amplify male migrant demand for sex workers, they considerably 
lower Han rates of natural increase in Tibet.
In other words, sustained net inflows of Han would be required merely 
to maintain their population share. For instance, taking the rate of natural 
increase for the TAR in 2003 and assuming that the Han contribution to this 
rate was zero (it was probably negative), a net inflow of at least 30,000 Han 
migrants per year would be required merely to maintain the Han population 
share (calculated from CSY 2004: Table 4-3). Such a net inflow might be 
sustained as long as the economy was booming and would definitely be sur-
passed in the summer months, but if the province were to follow a boom–bust 
cycle, the balloon of Han in-migration equally could deflate.
Thus, despite the visibility of in-migration to urban areas, Tibetan 
population shares in certain cases may be increasing rather than decreasing, 
particularly outside the TAR. For example, the share of Tibetans in the popu-
lation of Qinghai has been slowly edging upward during the reform period, 
from 18.5 percent in 1978 to 21.9 percent in 2004, and growing at about the 
same rate overall as that of the Hui Muslims (QSY 2005: Table 4-5).37 The Ti-
betan population share in the TAR fell between the 1990 and 2000 censuses, 
for reasons discussed above and because the Han have been increasing from 
a very small base. Some analysts argue that the increases in minority popu-
lations in China have been related in part to the switching of ethnic status by 
Han in order to take advantage of various preferential policies for minorities, 
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particularly between the 1982 and 1990 censuses, although this was probably 
less pronounced in the Tibetan areas than elsewhere in China.38 
Table 3 focuses on changes in Han and minority populations between the 
1990 and 2000 censuses. Note that Tibetans are not differentiated from other 
minorities. The category of minorities in the TAR is almost entirely Tibetan. It 
is about two-thirds Tibetan in Qinghai in combination with Mongours (Ch: Tu) 
and Mongolians (the other third being Hui and Salar); about one-third Tibetan 
in Sichuan; one-fifth Tibetan in Gansu; and a small fraction in Yunnan.
Outside the TAR, minorities have either increased or maintained their 
shares throughout the decade. This picture may reflect some ethnic status 
switching, although more generally the results are not surprising. As discussed 
above, outflows and demographic trends would tend to dominate inflows in 
these more fiscally austere provinces, particularly among the more mobile 
urbanites, who tend to be Han rather than Tibetan or Muslim.39 Overall these 
results are consistent with previous analyses that show the TAR as the only 
province where the Tibetan population share is decreasing, albeit from a very 
high level. 
Urban exclusions and intra-urban inequality
By all indications, the impression of an increasing Han or Muslim presence in 
eastern Tibet is not accurate at the aggregate level. It derives from an increased 
presence of migrants in urban areas, even while Tibetans are maintaining or 
even increasing their population dominance overall. This is still problematic, 
however, precisely because urban areas represent the centers of economic 
and political power. Hence, the real issue is economic and political dominance 
rather than population dominance. 
TABLE 3 Changes in Han and minority populations between 1990 and 2000, 
selected regions 
       All 
       Tibetans 
 TAR Qinghai Sichuan Gansu Yunnan China in China
Average annual population
 increase (percent)
Total 1.7 1.5 0.6 1.3 1.4 1.1 —
Minority 1.5 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.8
Han 6.5 0.9 0.5 1.3 1.4 1.0 —
Share of minorities in
 total population (percent)
1990 census 95.9 42.2 4.4 8.3 33.4 8.0 0.41
2000 census 93.9 45.6 5.0 8.7 33.4 8.4 0.43
Change –2.0 +3.4 +0.6 +0.4 0.0 +0.4 +0.02
SOURCES: Census data. Calculated from CPSY 2001: Tables 2-13, 2-14, and 2-21.
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More precisely, regardless of whether or not out-of-province migrants 
are flooding the local population, they are definitely flooding urban employ-
ment opportunities. This can be succinctly illustrated through an extrapola-
tion from the 2000 census data for the TAR. While permanent and temporary 
Han residents accounted for about 6 percent of the 2000 census population 
in the TAR, they accounted for nearly 20 percent of the town population 
and around 33 percent of the city population. Because they are concentrated 
in the economically active age groups (Ma and Lhundup 2006: 14), we can 
safely assume that some 80 percent of Han residents were economically ac-
tive. Indeed, most temporary migrants would eventually return home if they 
did not find employment. It is also safe to assume that they were working 
mostly outside agriculture, and we know that at least 80 percent of them 
resided in urban areas. Accordingly, their 6 percent population share in 2000 
was in effect equivalent to more than 38 percent of total employment outside 
the primary sector (both urban and rural) and more than 55 percent of total 
urban employment (employment data from CSY 2001: Table 5-4). In other 
words, the Han population share is magnified many times over in urban 
employment. Because the census probably underestimated the actual Han 
migrant population, particularly during the summer months, the magnifica-
tion itself would be underestimated. Moreover, it is clear from field observa-
tions that out-of-province migration to the TAR has increased rapidly since 
the 2000 census, particularly with the construction of the railway in the early 
2000s and the subsequent explosion in tourism from 2006 onward. Under 
these circumstances, even a small change in the overall Han population share 
(say from 6 percent to 8 percent) could have a very large impact on urban 
employment. 
If local residents in these Tibetan urban areas were able to use adminis-
trative means to protect themselves against migrant competition, as is increas-
ingly the case in other provinces in China, then perhaps this situation would 
be less contentious. However, local Tibetans do not have any of these means 
at their disposal, because their regions are effectively ruled by non-Tibetan 
outsiders, appointed either by Beijing in the case of the TAR or by provincial 
capitals in the case of Tibetan areas outside the TAR (see Fischer 2005: 73–84). 
Notably, no ethnic Tibetan has ever held the post of Party Secretary of the 
TAR, the TAR’s top leadership position. 
In this context, Tibetan locals have to play on a field that is far from 
level. The primary structural factor is education: Tibetans both inside and 
outside the TAR have by far the lowest education levels of all the main eth-
nic minorities in China. In the 2000 census, only 54.5 percent of the Tibetan 
population in China aged six and older had some form of primary education, 
compared with 92.7 percent for Han Chinese and 92.3 percent for China as a 
whole. Only 13.3 percent of Tibetans had some form of secondary education, 
versus 53.4 percent for Han Chinese and 52.3 percent for China as a whole 
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(calculated from CPSY 2003: Table 2-2; see Fischer 2005 for further detail). 
Simply on the basis of these quantitative comparisons, it is clear that the av-
erage local Tibetan is easily out-competed in the labor market by the average 
Han Chinese migrant. An additional qualitative dimension further compli-
cates matters. Tibetans who perform relatively well in an urban economy 
dominated by Central government spending and Chinese corporations are 
those who possess some degree of proficiency in Chinese. Given that Chinese-
medium education only starts at the secondary level in most Tibetan areas, 
the vast majority of Tibetans cannot attain this linguistic qualification. 
This educational divide does not necessarily mirror the urban–rural di-
vide. Some 41 percent of the permanently resident adult city population aged 
15 and older in the TAR was illiterate in 2004 (CPSY 2005: Table 1-24). This is 
an exceptionally high level of urban illiteracy in China, with no parallel in any 
other province. Given the lack of parallel, most of these illiterate adults were 
probably Tibetan. Indeed, this educational divide helps to explain why intra-
urban inequality, not just urban–rural inequality, has reached much higher 
levels in the TAR than in other provinces in China (Fischer 2005: 122). 
Conclusion: Urban fault lines of migration  
and exclusion
Tibetans have been in demographic transition, as have most other ethnic 
groups in China and, indeed, elsewhere in Asia. While they lag behind the 
Han in this transition, the lag is partially due to differences in family plan-
ning policies since the 1980s and other proximate factors since the 1950s. 
However, Tibetans’ demographic trends show enough similarities with those 
of the Han to clearly dismiss simplistic theories that Tibetans are either poor 
because they are demographically backward or demographically backward 
because they are poor. They are poor but they are relatively well advanced 
along the demographic transition, in the sense that fertility rates are now 
below replacement levels. 
Nonetheless, their position in the demographic transition does clarify 
some of the key social and economic aspects of modernity facing Tibetans. 
Relatively rapid population growth is not solely the result of Chinese rule, 
although the extension of primary public health care in the 1950s and 1960s 
obviously contributed to falling death rates, thus accelerating population 
growth. Nor is falling fertility solely the result of repressive birth control poli-
cies; more fundamentally, it is linked to the remote cause of falling mortality, 
along with a variety of proximate social and economic factors. 
Urbanization in turn sets the stage for understanding the crux of modern 
ethnic tensions within Tibetan areas. The contemporary meeting points be-
tween ethnic groups are towns and cities, as they were in the past, although 
with the important difference that modern demographic and economic transi-
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tions place far greater pressures on urban areas than historically was the case. 
In the process, rising population density and rapid urban expansion can give 
the visual impression that the more urbanized or economically successful 
groups (Han and Muslims) are becoming more dominant even while they are 
only maintaining or even losing their share in the overall population. 
Perceptions may thus be deceptive even while they fuel resentment and 
signal other underlying problems of considerable gravity. In the Tibetan areas, 
these problems relate to the interaction between demographic and economic 
transitions, particularly within the context of rapid economic growth that is 
heavily skewed toward urban areas. Yet this observation of urban bias tends 
to lead to the conclusion that effective ethnic discrimination in development 
is not due to intentional discrimination, but rather due to this spatial bias in 
development, as argued by Sautman and Eng (2001). Indeed, in line with the 
Chinese government, Sautman and Eng argue that out-of-province migration 
brings a net economic benefit to Tibet. As support, they refer to research on 
immigration that shows such benefits in the case of Canada. However, they 
ignore research on the migration of non-Aboriginals into Aboriginal regions 
in Canada, which would have been a much more appropriate comparison 
for the case of Tibet. 
There are a variety of problems with this argument. First, it ignores 
the fact that the urban–rural divide has been much higher in the TAR than 
elsewhere in China since the mid-1990s, which itself can be seen as a result 
of discrimination in development policy (see Fischer 2005). Moreover, in-
tra-urban inequality is also very high, and around 40 percent of permanent 
(i.e., non-migrant) urban residents in the TAR were illiterate in 2005, which 
suggests that the fundamental divide is not spatial but educational. In this 
respect, even though spatial polarization might distance rural dwellers from 
the portals of prosperity, the critical arenas where ethnic exclusion occurs in 
Tibet, for both rural and urban dwellers, are primarily urban. This is precisely 
where the political and economic levers of power are controlled, along with 
access to strategic and lucrative economic opportunities. In this light, it is 
mistaken to say that urban bias is the cause of ethnic discrimination in Tibet, 
although it clearly structures the way that discrimination occurs. This is in 
marked contrast to the situation in other ethnic minority regions in China, 
such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, where rural populations are more eth-
nically mixed and minority populations are better educated. 
Thus, while probably misconceived, the perception of “population in-
vasion” can be seen as a reactive lens through which locals interpret their 
concerns with modernity within a context of stark political disempowerment. 
In particular, the perception voices a legitimate concern that Han Chinese 
in-migration might exacerbate economic exclusion among Tibetan locals 
in their towns and cities, particularly at a critical stage of their demographic 
and economic transitions when such exclusions will no doubt heavily influ-
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ence the long-term course of ethnic stratification. Nevertheless, the logic of 
peripheral development in western areas of China would tend to counter the 
thesis of population invasion. If anything, population outflow, particularly 
among the better-educated, is an important developmental constraint in these 
areas. Nevertheless, this conflation of Han in-migration and Tibetan exclusion 
seems to provide the discursive lens through which Tibetans perceive their 
disempowerment.
Methodological appendix
This study is derived from a larger interdisciplinary research project examining Chi-
nese development strategies in Tibet. The project involved quantitative and qualitative 
research to examine politically sensitive issues within a tightly controlled field setting 
characterized by effective occupation and repressed political dissent. 
Quantitative data were mostly obtained from publicly available official statistical 
sources, such as the 2000 census tabulations, the China Population Statistical Yearbook 
from various years, and the China (and various provincial) Statistical Yearbook from 
various years. While the accuracy of these official sources is often questioned, the 
alternative of conducting independent household surveys was impossible given the 
political situation. However, in defense of these data sources, I have generally found 
that they are corroborated by my fieldwork in terms of representing broad structural 
trends over time. The issue of data quality was therefore not an overwhelming ob-
stacle for the inductive nature of quantitative analysis required for this study. 
The data are nonetheless limited by what has and has not been divulged in official 
sources. Outside of population censuses, official Chinese sources do not disaggregate 
data by ethnicity. Thus some creative extrapolation is often required to circumvent 
the data limitations and to tease out insights from the available data. This includes 
using the rural data for the TAR, which represents an almost entirely Tibetan popu-
lation, as a proxy for the general experience of Tibetans outside the TAR. The rural 
data for the other Chinese provinces containing Tibetan autonomous areas are 
overwhelmed by the population weight of non-Tibetans in the non-Tibetan areas of 
the provinces. Using the TAR data to approximate broad trends outside the TAR is 
arguably a valid approach, at least with respect to rural areas, given strong similarities 
across Tibetan areas and stark differences between these areas and the rest of China 
in terms of topography, population density, patterns of land use and livelihood, levels 
and composition of average rural household incomes, education levels, and health 
indexes. Nonetheless, an effort has been made throughout this study to find suitable 
sub-provincial data for Tibetan areas outside the TAR in order to render this proxy 
method more rigorous. 
Similarly, the qualitative methods were eclectic given the political sensitivity of 
the issues researched. Formal surveys were not possible; thus the field methods were 
basically ethnographic. However, a wide variety of field sites was sampled, each with 
much less depth than would be normally accorded by purely ethnographic methods. 
This approach was taken partly to avoid spending too much time in each community 
for political reasons, and also partly as a means to trace broader processes operating 
across the regional Tibetan system.
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My fieldwork included 12 months spent in Tibet and China between June 2003 
and January 2005, and two subsequent one-month visits in December 2005 and Sep-
tember 2007. This was more generally informed by seven years of predoctoral field 
experience living in Tibetan refugee communities in India and Nepal from 1995 to 
2001. The fieldwork in Tibet was conducted in all three of the major Tibetan regions 
(Utsang, Kham, and Amdo) and in four of the five Chinese provinces containing 
Tibetan areas (the TAR, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Gansu). The largest portion of time 
was concentrated in Amdo/Qinghai for multiple reasons, from logistics and freedom 
of movement to research interest. Extensive visits were made to both farming and 
pastoral areas in Qinghai, Sichuan, and Gansu, including repeated and extended 
contact within eight rural communities. Limited rural travel was also undertaken in 
the TAR, although this was restricted owing to the control over the movement of for-
eign researchers outside Lhasa. Urban areas visited included (Tibetan names used for 
Tibetan towns): Lhasa and Shigatse in the TAR; Xining, Xunhua, Chentsa, Rebgong, 
Sogwo, Chabcha, Mangra, Jyeku, Dawu, and Darlak in Qinghai; Lanzhou, Linxia, and 
Labrang (Ch: Xiahe) in Gansu; Chengdu, Shichu, Derge, Manikango, Kardze, Drango, 
Dawu, Tagong, Dartsedo (Ch: Kangding), and Ngawa in Sichuan; and several short 
visits to research centers and universities in Beijing. The urban areas were chosen for 
their importance as regional centers for local government administration, education, 
business, off-farm employment, and migration. 
Fieldwork entailed informal and unstructured interviews, conversations, focus 
groups, participant observation, and general living experience within households 
in several of these settings, in both rural and urban areas. Interviewee selection 
was determined through snowball sampling; the political sensitivity of the research 
precluded representative sampling as well as extended ethnographic contacts. Some 
interviews were conducted by myself in Tibetan (mostly in Central Tibet), some were 
conducted by myself in English with Tibetans or Chinese who spoke English, and 
about half were conducted with the assistance of either a Tibetan translator (in the 
case of interviews with Tibetans, particularly those from Eastern Tibet) or a Chinese 
translator (in the case of interviews with Chinese or Muslims and some educated 
Tibetans). The exact number of informants is difficult to quantify because in many 
cases contact was made in very fluid social settings. However, it is possible to enu-
merate roughly 228 key informants, in terms of contacts that resulted in significant 
and substantive field insights. This sampling was disproportionately weighted toward 
more elite informants, particularly local Tibetan, Chinese, and Muslim scholars who 
possess a wealth of knowledge but are considerably more constrained than foreign 
researchers in the dissemination of their findings. 
Notes
The Crisis States Research Centre at the 
London School of Economics generously pro-
vided funding for field research in 2003 and 
2004, all of which directly contributed to this 
article. Additional funding was provided by 
the Central Research Fund of the University 
of London, the Québec Government (Fonds 
québecois de la recherche sur la société et la 
culture), the UK Government (Overseas Re-
search Student Award), the London School 
of Economics, and the Canadian Section 
of Amnesty International. I am also enor-
mously indebted to Tim Dyson, my mentor 
in demography, and I benefited greatly from 
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many generous exchanges with Geoff Childs 
and Melvyn Goldstein over the years. Last but 
not least, I am deeply grateful to numerous 
people in Tibet and China.
1 In this article, “China” refers to the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and “Tibet” 
refers to all of the Tibetan areas in China, in-
cluding the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 
and the Tibetan areas incorporated into the 
provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and 
Yunnan. Often known as “Greater Tibet” 
or “cultural Tibet,” this region is about the 
size of Western Europe or about 25 percent 
of China. This larger understanding of Tibet 
is actually not controversial in that it con-
forms to administrative definitions in China, 
which identify Tibetan autonomous areas 
at various levels of jurisdiction. The TAR is 
equivalent to a province, whereas Tibetan 
areas incorporated into the other provinces 
are designated as either autonomous prefec-
tures (TAPs) or autonomous counties (TACs). 
With the exception of some disagreements in 
the borderlands of Eastern Tibet, the Chinese 
administrative definitions are almost identical 
to the definition of Tibet used by the Tibetan 
Exile Government, and they conform to the 
areas that Tibetans consider to be Tibet. Most 
of these highland areas, at average altitudes 
of well over 3,000 meters, are also clearly 
differentiated from non-Tibetan lowlands by 
topography and population density. While 
the TAR is the administrative area that the 
PRC government and most of the Western 
media usually mean when they refer to Tibet, 
it accounts for just over half of the Tibetan 
autonomous areas in China and less than half 
of the total Tibetan population in China. The 
boundaries of this region were determined 
by the territory controlled by Lhasa at the 
time the PRC invaded the eastern part of this 
territory in 1950 (see the chapter entitled 
“The People’s Liberation Army Invades” in 
Goldstein 1989: 638–696).
2 Following conventions in the literature 
on minorities in China, the term “Chinese 
Muslim” refers to an amalgamation of Muslim 
groups across China. An important concen-
tration is located in northeast Qinghai and 
Gansu Provinces, bordering Northeast Tibet. 
Unlike Uyghurs from Xinjiang, who are Tur-
kic Muslims, the majority of these Muslims 
are Chinese-speaking. 
3 For instance, following the widespread 
Tibetan protests across China in March 2008, 
the Dalai Lama reasserted his view that Chi-
na’s policy of resettling Chinese migrants 
within Tibet amounts to “demographic ag-
gression” and even “cultural genocide” (see 
VOA 2008). Similar views were echoed by 
Tibet advocacy organizations in exile and in 
the West.
4 See the interview with Samdhong Rim-
poche, Prime Minister of the Tibetan Govern-
ment in Exile, in Mahalanobis (2003).
5 The Dalai Lama’s position on cultural 
genocide shows little change from previous 
official exile statements on population trans-
fer and control, as in TGIE (1993, 1996).
6 See Kwok (2008) for a report on a 
government-organized foreign press confer-
ence in Beijing following the Tibetan protests 
in March 2008, when Tibetan researchers 
from the China Tibetology Research Centre 
insisted that claims of population invasion 
were exaggerated. 
7 For instance, in PRC (2001: Question 
20), the government argues that after 1951, 
“helping the Tibetan people to develop their 
economy and improve their living conditions 
became the common concern of the central 
government and the Chinese people, and it is 
an important facet of China’s modernization 
drive.” Later in Question 56, it argues that 
“with the constant improvement in health 
care and living standards of Tibetan people, 
the long stagnant population growth of Tibet 
has seen a sharp increase.” Moreover, in 
Question 55, it contends that “[t]hese days 
Han residents in Tibet are mostly technicians, 
workers, teachers, medical professionals and 
officials from other provinces, municipalities 
and autonomous regions of China.”
8 PRC (2001: Question 17); “With the 
support of the central government and peo-
ple of other areas, Tibet has developed its 
pillar industries through utilization of its rich 
resources.”
9 For more examples of these official ar-
guments, see PRC (2001: Questions 17, 18, 20, 
54, 55, 56, and 58). 
10 This irony and its political ration-
ale are discussed in depth by Childs (2008: 
214–231).
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11 See Ma and Pan (1992); Xi et al. 
(1992); Anderson et al. (1995); Guo (1996); 
Ma (1996); Sun and Li (1996); Marshall and 
Cooke (1997); Iredale et al. (2001); Goldstein 
et al. (2002); Childs (2000, 2001a, 2001b, 
2003, 2004, 2006, 2008); and Childs et al. 
(2005).
12 See Fischer 2005: xx–xxii and the 
methodological appendix for further elabo-
ration.
13 See PD (2002) for an example of these 
assertions in the official Chinese press. 
14 See Childs (2008: 216–221) and 
Fischer (2008: 133–136 and 142–143) for 
further discussion.
15 This is not to suggest that Beijing sees 
population growth as a positive factor for 
development in Tibet. Rather, from another 
perspective, it argues that poverty in Tibet is 
exacerbated by population growth and envi-
ronmental degradation (e.g., see PRC 2001: 
Question 22).
16 For instance, an Asian Development 
Bank report on western China implicitly re-
fers to Tibetans as a “pretransitional” minority 
(ADB 2003: 268).
17 See Childs (2008: 214–221) for an 
excellent discussion of historical demographic 
estimates for the TAR. He adeptly debunks 
the common hypothesis in the Chinese 
literature that the Tibetan population was 
shrinking, or at best stagnant, up to the 1950s 
because of exceptionally high death rates and 
low levels of fertility. 
18 While the number of Tibetans who 
died during this period is a subject of conten-
tious debate, there is little doubt that Tibetans 
suffered disproportionately relative to most 
other groups in China. There was widespread 
armed uprising and intense counterinsur-
gency in the Tibetan areas of Sichuan from 
1956 onward, in Qinghai and Gansu from 
1958 onward, and in the TAR in 1959–60. 
For background, mostly focused on the TAR, 
see Goldstein (1998) and Shakya (1999; 2002: 
43). Mortality rates in Qinghai, Gansu, and 
Sichuan were also among the highest in the 
country during the famine of the Great Leap 
Forward (Yang 1996: 33). Official popula-
tion records for Qinghai show that the Ti-
betan population of that province fell by over 
100,000 people, or more than 20 percent, 
between 1957 and 1963 (QSY 1991: 163), 
although caution must be used with these 
statistics given their doubtful accuracy.
19 The sustained improvement can be 
roughly represented by the fact that crude 
death rates fell below 10 per thousand in the 
TAR and other western provinces by the mid 
to late 1960s (see Figure 3 for data on the 
TAR, and QSY 2005: Table 4-1 for data on 
Qinghai). On lags with China, life expectancy 
for all of China (both sexes combined) was 
68.6 years in the 1990 census and 71.4 years 
in the 2000 census, whereas it was 59.6 years 
and 64.4 years respectively for the TAR (CSY 
2007: Table 4-6). UNICEF reported that (of-
ficial) infant mortality stood at 53 per 1,000 
live births in the TAR in 2000, and maternal 
mortality at over 400 per 100,000 live births, 
versus 35 per 1,000 and 56 per 100,000 in 
China overall in 2000 (UN 2004). Unofficial-
ly, health workers from several international 
nongovernmental organizations in the TAR 
whom I interviewed estimated that rates of 
infant and maternal mortality were much 
higher, perhaps double the official figures.
20 These data include urban areas and 
non-Tibetan populations. Alternatively, 
Childs (2008) analyzed village-level survey 
data collected by Goldstein et al. (2002) from 
an entirely rural Tibetan sample. These data 
reveal similar patterns, showing a peaking 
of the TFR at 6.3 in 1986, after which it fell 
rapidly from 1989 onward. Childs emphasizes 
the speed of the fertility transition that oc-
curred simultaneously in both the rural areas 
of the TAR and the exile community; TFRs fell 
in an almost identical manner, from around 
6 in the late 1980s to below replacement by 
2000 (ibid.: 237–239). 
21 It is not clear why the crude birth and 
death rates for the TAR were so low in 1965. 
The CBR does not correspond to the official 
TFRs discussed above, suggesting that these 
data for the TAR in 1965 are inaccurate and 
can be disregarded.
22 For an analysis of the latter discourse, 
see Childs (2008: 221–231).
23 See this argument in PRC (2001: 
Question 57). For general background on 
minority family planning policy, see Zhang 
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(1990); Anon. (1991); Yang and Liu (1992); 
Yang and Zhu (1993); and Greenhalgh 
(2003).
24 For examples of these allegations, see 
TIN (1994) and TSGUK (no date).
25 For instance, official statistics for 
Qinghai report a sharp drop in the CBR be-
tween 1980 and 1985, from 21.1 per thou-
sand to 14.2, but it then increased to 24.9 in 
1986 and remained at that level until the late 
1990s (QSY 2004: Table 4-1; data not avail-
able for 1981–84). The sharp drop in 1985 
might reflect an aggressive application of 
family planning measures in the early 1980s, 
thus explaining the reports of abuse from 
the exile community in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Alternatively, the data might simply 
reflect problems of under-reporting. 
26 Communications from various con-
tacts working in the area.
27 There has been considerable debate 
on the conventional allegation that flooding 
in the lowlands of China or other forms of 
environmental degradation have been caused 
by overgrazing in the highland pastoral areas 
of western China (e.g., see Williams 1997). 
However, it is generally accepted that agrar-
ian land colonization schemes implemented 
by the government in Tibetan pastoral areas 
in the 1960s and 1970s were a failure, causing 
considerable land degradation, particularly 
in Qinghai.
28 For instance, agrarian colonization 
policies were practiced with some success in 
Kangding (Tib: Dartsedo) in Sichuan as early 
as the late Qing Dynasty, similar to the situa-
tion in Inner Mongolia (Coleman 2002; van 
Spengen 2002; and Tuttle 2005). As a result, 
the county now contains a strong rural Han 
presence. Nonetheless, the population be-
comes indisputably Tibetan after the first pass 
west of Kangding Town, with almost no Han 
in the rural areas (confirmed with local resi-
dents during fieldwork in the area in 2004).
29 This observation comes from my field 
experience with Tibetan refugees in India and 
Nepal from 1995 to 2001 and from interviews 
with returnees during fieldwork in Tibet in 
2003 and 2004.
30 Iredale et al. (2003) argue that minor-
ity populations in China are significantly less 
mobile than the Han. Their mobility started 
to increase in the 1990s, although much later 
than among the Han.
31 Provincial population statistics do not 
include resident military populations, which 
are considerable in both the TAR and Qing-
hai. For instance, estimates for the military 
in the TAR in the 1990s ranged anywhere 
between 40,000 and 200,000 or more (UNPO 
1997: 70). Taking an estimate of 130,000 
would yield about one soldier for every 20 
residents in 2000, versus one for every 4,500 
residents in China overall. This large military 
presence is obviously related to the vast bor-
der area of the TAR.
32 China stipulates a de jure approach to 
residency status, meaning that residency is 
recorded by officially registered status regard-
less of the amount of time spent in a location, 
in contrast to standard international defini-
tions, which consider de facto residency. The 
Chinese approach is equivalent to a concept 
of citizenship, such that a person can reside 
in a place for years without being considered 
permanent in the census as long as he or she 
has not made an official change in status.
33 Although data on ethnicity and 
residency status are tabulated separately in 
Tabulation (2002), the residency status of 
the Han in the TAR can be extrapolated by 
comparing the total Han count in the 2000 
census (158,570) with the population records 
of nationalities reported in the Tibet Statistical 
Yearbook (i.e., TSY 2005: Table 3-4). While the 
latter do not indicate any source, they pre-
sumably are drawn from the Public Security 
Department (PSD), which is responsible for 
residency registration, given that the numbers 
match those reported in CSY (2002: Table 
2-9), which cites the PSD as its data source. 
If the PSD data for 2000 are compared to the 
2000 census tabulation on residency status 
(Tabulation 2002: Table 2-2), the PSD count 
for the TAR (2.51 million) falls in between the 
permanently residing population (2.39 mil-
lion) and the population either permanently 
residing or residing for more than six months 
but registered elsewhere (2.587 million). In 
other words, the PSD data probably use a 
cutoff criterion that lies somewhere between 
long-term temporary residency and perma-
nent residency. These (apparently) PSD data 
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